De la distinction entre Stimmung et sentiments existentiels : la pertinence pour les cas psychiatriques
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.35494/topsem.2023.1.49.848Mots-clés :
Sentiments existentiels, Heidegger, PsychiatrieRésumé
Des débats récents en philosophie, en psychologie et en sciences cognitives ont souligné le rôle des émotions comme constituant le substrat de base de notre vie affective. La recherche phénoménologique contemporaine, en particulier, a abordé la dimension expérientielle des émotions et leur relation avec les questions ontologiques et taxonomiques. Cet article cherche à contribuer à ce débat en présentant une distinction entre la notion de Stimmung de Heidegger et la notion de sentiments existentiels de Ratcliffe. Comme les Stimmungen de Heidegger, les sentiments existentiels déterminent notre manière de se trouver dans le monde. Dans certains cas, cependant, le monde peut sembler irréel, distant, imprégné d’un profond désespoir. Mon objectif principal est donc de clarifier la relation entre ces catégories descriptives en faisant appel à la description des troubles psychiatriques. Je présente des raisons taxonomiques, conceptuelles et méthodologiques pour distinguer la Stimmung des sentiments existentiels.
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